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 Tipping Points: Referral Homophily and Job Segregation 
Abstract 
How does referral recruitment contribute to job segregation?  Current theory emphasizes 
the segregated nature of job-seekers’ information and contact networks.  The job-seeker 
perspective characterizing most research on network effects in the labor market leaves little role 
for organizational influence.  But referrals are necessarily initiated within a firm by referrers. 
This paper focuses on the neglected half of the referring dyad and seeks to explain the 
segregating effects of referring from the referrer’s perspective.  Our main finding is that if a firm 
can get its under-represented group to refer more, referral recruitment can be made neutral to job 
segregation, or even integrative. Our analysis reveals a tipping point in referring dynamics – 
precisely how much more the under-represented group needs to refer to neutralize the 
segregating effects of referring. We build upon previous research to generate a formal model of 
referring dynamics as a regular Markov population process.  We use this model to build theory 
regarding the segregating effects of referring, and the role of organizations in this process. In so 
doing, we show the prevailing wisdom fails to explain how referring contributes to job 
segregation. We reveal the conditions necessary for referring to segregate and identify policy 




Most organizations recruit new workers via informal referrals, along with other more formal 
methods (Marsden and Gorman 2001).  Reliance on referral recruitment is particularly strong among 
smaller firms without dedicated recruiting budgets or personnel, firms which constitute about half of the 
labor market (Bartram et al. 1995; Barber, Wesson and Roberson 1999; Mencken and Winfield 1998).  
Referral recruitment is also important to job-seekers.  Approximately half of all workers in the U.S. used 
their personal contact networks to find their current jobs (Granovetter 1995; Marsden and Gorman 2001). 
Despite being a pervasive labor market practice, there have been numerous calls to reduce or even 
eliminate referral recruitment in organizations (Braddock and McPartland 1987; LoPresto 1986; Padavic 
and Reskin 2002; Roos and Reskin 1984).  Because referral recruitment has long been theorized as 
contributing to job segregation1 (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Kanter 1977; Marsden 1994; Marsden and 
Gorman 2001; Moss and Tilly 2001; Mouw 2002; Reskin, McBrier and Kmec 1999). Job segregation has 
numerous organizational and societal costs.  Perhaps the most prominent of these effects is gender wage 
inequality – most of which is attributable to the sex segregation of jobs (Baron and Bielby 1986; Bayard 
et al. 2003; Kmec 2003; Petersen and Morgan 1995; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993).  In addition, segregation 
introduces harmful labor market rigidities – where fluctuations in demand can result in shortages (e.g., 
recent shortages in engineers and nurses) or gluts for particular jobs rather than being absorbed by job 
mobility (Anker 1997; Kahn 2000; Padavic & Reskin 2002:58-9). From an organizational and legal 
perspective, job segregation is often taken as evidence of violations in U.S. Equal Employment 
opportunity (EEO) laws (Gutman 2000), and is associated with the successful prosecution of EEO 
                                                 
1 Although referral recruitment is viewed to have associations with both the race and sex segregation of jobs, in this 
paper we focus on sex segregation. The simplifying choice to focus on sex segregation was a pragmatic one: 
modeling the dynamics of a dichotomous variable such as sex is more straightforward than a multi-valued (and 
potentially multi-dimensional) variable as race. We recognize this choice as a limitation. Sex and race are both 
important and omnipresent social markers of individuals in organizational contexts (Ashforth and Humphrey 1995; 
Heilman 1995; Hirschfield 1999), and these particular markers interact in complex ways (Chafetz 1997), especially 
in the context of the labor market (Browne and Misra 2003; Robinson et. al. 2005). This simplification neither 
makes any assumptions of the relative importance of one type of segregation over another, nor reflects a view that 
the homogenous treatment of groups by race or sex, and not both simultaneously, is unproblematic. We plan to 
expand the model in the future to include race and sex simultaneously. 
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complaints (Hirsch 2006).  Thus, organizations face a dilemma: referral recruitment is economically 
efficient (e.g., Fernandez, Castilla and Moore 2000), but also places the organization at risk for 
contributing to job segregation.  Our analysis shows that it is possible for organizations to manage referral 
recruitment to preserve the practice but eliminate its segregating effects. 
The current literature on referral processes and their relation to job segregation suffers from two 
major deficits.  The first is its almost exclusive focus on job-seekers and their networks. The referral 
process requires a dyad.2  The referral is the job-seeker using her networks to identify job opportunities.  
The other half of the dyad is the referrer – necessarily an organizational member aware of a job 
opportunity who shares that information with the referral. From the perspective of organizations, there is 
little the organization can do to influence either the network structure or job-search behaviors of the job-
seeker.  For this reason, organizations have largely been absolved from any responsibility for the 
segregating outcomes of referral recruitment (e.g., National Research Council, 2004: 43).  But the referrer 
is an organizational member and subject to organizational influence; a fact demonstrated by practices 
such as the referral bonus. Despite this potential for managing at least half of the referrer-referral dyad, 
organizations have been given few tools to mitigate the segregating effects of referring.   
The second deficit characterizing this literature is the lack of a process-based understanding of the 
segregating effects of referring. Although some empirical work has established a link between referral 
processes and job segregation (Braddock and McPartland 1997; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006; 
Fernandez and Sosa 2005; Mouw 2002; Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2001), there has been no formal 
mechanism-based theory of how one is associated one with the other. Mechanism-based theories can 
serve as invaluable aids in designing organizational interventions and moving research forward 
(Hedström 2005; Reskin 2003; Schelling 1998). 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we define referral applicants as those applicants who can identify an in-firm referrer by name. 
Indeed, referral bonus policies are predicated on precisely this type of dyadic relationship. We recognize that some 
definitions of referral applicants are more broad and could include contacts from non-employees e.g., those who 
learned of a job advertisement through a friend not employed by the hiring company.  
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This paper addresses both of these deficits.  We operationalize a mechanism-based theory of 
referral processes as a formal mathematical model.  Our model is designed from the perspective of the 
referrer, focusing on the networking yields of referring employees.  Our analysis leads to some important 
and novel insights.  Notably, we uncover an implicit confusion in the literature regarding the nature of 
referral homophily: is referral homophily absolute – that is, set in the labor market and independent of 
job-specific factors, or is it relative – that is, to some extent varying from job to job?  We are able to 
resolve this confusion in a manner that challenges the received wisdom concerning how referring 
contributes to job segregation.  In so doing, we are able to specify the conditions under which referring 
can segregate. This finding leads us to our major revelation: organizations can manage the referral 
process to render it neutral to job segregation, or even turn it into an integrating mechanism.  We identify 
that sex differences in referring rates yield a critical tipping point at which referring will have no 
segregating effect and beyond which referring will actually serve to integrate a job.  
Our paper is organized as follows:  in the first section, we review the existing literature on referral 
networks and job segregation to identify the elements of a mechanism-based theory.  The second section 
identifies an implicit disagreement in the literature regarding the structuring of referrer-referral ties, 
formalizes these two distinct views, and presents empirical findings addressing the conflict.  The third 
section introduces our regular Markovian population process model of the segregating effects of referring, 
and uses an analysis of this model to resolve the conflicting views from before by exposing their 
necessary consequences. The fourth section expands upon the model to reveal an important policy lever in 
asymmetries in referring rates.  This analysis uncovers the titular tipping points of referral processes. The 
simplicity of the tipping point result presents immediate propositions and potential organizational policy 
recommendations.  The final section summarizes our findings and lays out a research agenda to expand 
upon this referrer-based perspective of networks and labor market outcomes. 




Granovetter's groundbreaking work (1973) was arguably the harbinger of the large stream of 
research into the labor market role of social networks. Possibly inheriting Granovetter’s perspective, this 
subsequent scholarship has largely taken the form of seeking to explain labor market outcomes as a 
function of the characteristics of job seekers' networks. When investigating gendered aspects of referring 
from the perspective of job seekers, researchers have sought to reveal the proportion of referrers that are 
the same sex as the job seeker (e.g., Drentea 1998; Hanson and Pratt 1991; Mencken and Winfield 2000). 
This formulation prioritizes job-seekers' behaviors and network characteristics at the cost of neglecting 
any effects deriving from the behaviors of those people who initiate the referral process – referrers. 
Referrers are necessarily firm employees, and potentially subject to organizational influence. In 
one simple example of firm influence on referring behavior, many firms offer referral bonuses to 
encourage referring behavior among their employees (e.g., Fernandez and Castilla 2001).  However, when 
investigating the relationship between referring and the segregation of jobs, consideration for the role of 
referrers has largely been absent. 
The existing literature positing associations between referring and job segregation outcomes is 
voluminous (Bielby 2000:123; Braddock and McPartland 1987; Doeringer and Piore 1971; Drentea 1998; 
Fernandez and Sosa 2005; Granovetter 1995; Hanson and Pratt 1991; Kanter 1977; Kmec 2005; Marsden 
1994; Marsden and Gorman 2001; Moss and Tilly 2001; Mouw 2002; Padavic and Reskin 2002; 
Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2000; Reskin 1993; Reskin, McBrier and Kmec 1999; Roos and Reskin 
1984; Straits 1998). Studies about the associations between referring and job segregation tend to 
emphasize the role of homophily in job seekers’ networks – the degree to which job seekers receive their 
job information from socially similar, here same-sex, others. (Drentea 1998; Hanson and Pratt 1991; 
Huffman and Torres 2001, 2002; Mencken and Winfield 2000; Rankin 2003; Straits 1998).  
The job-seeker perspective regarding the segregating effects of referring posits that job seekers 
differentially seek out job opportunities from similar others, or naturally exist in segregated contact 
networks and therefore are dependent upon socially similar referrers for job referrals. The salient point is 
Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
5 
 
that homophily in job seekers’ networks does not involve the organizations that are offering the jobs. 
From the perspective of organizations, there is nothing the organization can do to influence the level of 
this type of homophily in the labor market. 
We take a referrer-based perspective, and concern ourselves with the structure of referrers' 
networks. These networks are composed of dyads consisting of the referrer and her referred job applicant 
– the referral.3 We consider the role of homophily in these networks by attending to same-sex referring 
(SSR) behaviors of referrers.  For both male and female referrers in an organization, we define their SSR 
probability as the probability that a referral applicant generated by the referrer is the same sex as the 
referrer. We will use these probabilities in constructing our model of the segregating effects of referring. 
We denote the SSR probability for male referrers as P, and the SSR probability for female referrers as Q. 
Male referrers then generate referral applicants that are male with a probability P and female with a 
probability 1-P. Similarly, the referral applicants generated by female referrers are female with a 
probability Q and male with a probability 1-Q. 
We have not yet defined the meaning of homophily from the referrers’ perspective.  The reason is 
that the referrer-based perspective on referring dynamics reveals the literature to be equivocal on how 
referral homophily should be defined.  The fundamental disagreement rests in whether referral homophily 
as a general social phenomenon, independent of job-specific factors, and a property of a labor market, or 
is referral homophily in part contingent on job-specific factors.  Through its silence on the role of 
organizations, the dominant job-seeker perspective implicitly supports the former proposition.  The latter 
job-specific view has been voiced briefly in an empirical case study (Fernandez and Sosa 2005), where it 
received empirical support. 
Examples in the literature where homophily among social ties has been defined explicitly (e.g., 
Heckathorn 2002; Mollica, Gray and Trevino 2003; Skvoretz, Fararo and Agneessens 2004) all 
                                                 
3 Our emphasis is on the referrer-referral dyad. Referrers who share a job opportunity with a potential referral who 
does not in turn actually apply for the job is not a successful generation of a referral applicant.  The dyad is formed 
both by the actions of the referrer in sharing job opportunity information, and by the actions of the referral in 
applying for that particular job. 
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emphasize defining homophily as a biasing deviation away from a referent of unbiased or random ties. 
That is, if ties were formed randomly, there would still be some ties to socially similar people just by 
chance (usually reflective of their representation within the population of potential alters). Homophily is 
the adjustment away from this random network towards one that is more socially similar than what would 
occur by chance.   
The literature on biased networks addresses these concepts directly. This literature presents the tie 
formation process as being composed of both a random component and a biased component (Skvoretz, 
Fararo and Agneessens 2004; Heckathorn 2002:20).  The biased component in this case is homophily – 
the promotion of same-sex ties above and beyond the random component.4  When homophily is perfect, 
referrers generate exclusively same-sex referral applicants.  Homophily can also be negative, as in 
heterophily. Under perfect heterophily (perfect negative homophily), referrers generate exclusively 
opposite-sex referral applicants. When homophily is wholly absent, referrers generate referral applicants 
in a random and unbiased manner.   The result of unbiased referring is the counterfactual against which 
referral homophily is defined. Defining this counterfactual composition of referral applicants absent the 
influences of homophily is critical in structuring referral dynamics.  The two positions on defining referral 
homophily have fundamentally different views on the determination of the counterfactual composition 
produced by unbiased referring. 
We introduce a parameter c, for the counterfactual composition (as percent female) of referral 
applicants generated by unbiased or random referring, and a parameter h, for the biasing component of 
referrer-referral ties resulting from the tendency towards homophilous (same-sex) ties.  As c gives the 
percent female, 1 – c gives the percent male of the referral applicants generated by unbiased referring. 
The c parameter is identical for male and female referrers by definition. These two new parameters (c and 
h) serve as the building blocks for the same-sex referring probabilities, P and Q. We can write both 
probabilities as the deviation from the counterfactual composition resulting from unbiased referring (c for 
                                                 
4 We make no claims regarding the antecedents of homophily as a phenomenon.  Whether due to agentic choices of 
the referrer, extant social or cultural norms, imposed structural constraints, or combinations of these and other 
forces, contact networks tend toward homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001).  
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women and 1 –  c for men), and the bias term (h) from homophily. The probability that referral applicants 
generated by female referrers are also female, Q, can be written as: Q = c + h.  Similarly, the probability 
that referral applicants generated by male referrers are male, P, can be written as: P = 1 – c + h. Whether 
and to what extent the homophily adjustment parameter, h varies by sex will be discussed in more detail 
below.  In terms of these new parameters, the disagreement in the literature is in how the counterfactual 
composition of women among the referrals produced without bias (c) should be defined. 
Referral homophily: Two views 
The random component of referring must reflect the outcome if a referrer were to refer without 
regard to the ascriptive category (here, sex) of her potential referral.  Would this composition be singular 
and invariant across different jobs in the labor market, or might job-specific factors also influence this 
counterfactual composition of referral applicants resulting in many different values for c in a given labor 
market? We found most of the theoretical statements about referral processes silent regarding any job-
specific dependencies for c, and consistent with the job-invariant view. An alternative view along with 
some empirical evidence explicitly supports a job-specific definition of c. These two distinct perspectives 
concerning the counterfactual each entail different dynamics for the segregating effects of referring.   
Dominant view 
Theory 
The dominant view of the association between referral hiring and job segregation posits that the 
fact of homophily in referral networks entails that male referrers will generate a predominantly male set 
of referral applicants, and that female referrers will generate a predominantly female set of referral 
applicants.  Given this tendency, referral recruitment can keep male dominated jobs male, and female 
dominated jobs female. We use the following quotes to illustrate this point: 
 “Current employees and others who distribute information about [a job] opening through 
interpersonal channels will tend to pass it along to socially similar persons” (Marsden 1994:981);  
 “[M]ore often than not, members of workers' networks are their same sex and race” (Reskin and 
Padavic 2002:81);  
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 “Occupational sex segregation persists in white-collar jobs in part because information networks are 
sex segregated” (Roos and Reskin 1984:245).  
 “Social networks tend toward closure along most dimensions; hence, persons hired through networks 
tend to be socially similar to those referring them” (Marsden and Gorman 2001:471). 
The first two quotes simply emphasize the segregated nature of job referral networks.  The third 
quote explicitly asserts an association between segregated referring networks and the perpetuation of job 
segregation. The final quote is the most specific regarding the generation of referral applicants.  If referral 
hires tend to be socially similar to their referrers (net other individual characteristics such as human 
capital), then if follows that referrers tend to generate socially similar referral applicants.  In other words, 
male referrers tend to generate male referral applicants and female referrers tend to generate female 
referral applicants. The dominant view is silent with regard to any changes in these tendencies contingent 
on job-specific factors.  
Translating this theory into our model parameters, we see the dominant view entailing that:  
1. P and Q are both larger than 0.5 (i.e., male referrers generate majority male referral 
applicants and female referrers generate majority female referral applicants), and 
2. P and Q are independent of the particular type of job using referral recruitment.  
What does the dominant view entail for the counterfactual parameter, c and the homophily adjustment, h? 
As the dominant view comes from literature largely emphasizing the job-seeker perspective, inferring an 
operationalization for c (percent female among the referrals produced by unbiased referring) and h (the 
homophily adjustment away from c) from this body of work is necessarily an interpretive endeavor.  We 
work backwards from the two consequences above to determine the implications of the dominant view for 
the referrer-based perspective of referring. 
One way to view the effect of random or unbiased referring would be to consider the result if a 
referrer were able to refer every individual in the labor market to apply for the job – who would apply?  
The dominant view might suggest that a representative subset of referrals would apply, and thus unbiased 
referring would generate referral applicants who are representative of the labor market as a whole.  One 
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variation on this idea might suggest unbiased referral applicants would be representative of the 
unemployed (thus presumably job-seeking) labor pool, rather than the whole workforce. U.S. Census 
Bureau data (2002) suggests that in either case the gender composition of the counterfactual, c would be 
close to 0.47 (and with standard deviations of less than 0.05 when looking across the 280 MSAs available 
in the Census sample file).  In this case, both c and 1 – c are close to 0.5.  Consequently, in order for the 
referral homophily parameters P and Q both to be greater than 0.5, h can be any positive number between 
about 0.04 and 0.47. The dominant view of referring dynamics does not make any explicit claims 
affecting the structure of h, or whether it should be the same or different by sex. With this 
operationalization, we can reproduce the characteristics of the dominant view: men tend to refer men and 
women tend to refer women in a manner that is independent from job-specific variation. 
Although we presented one possibility for how the dominant view would construct c and h, we 
cannot be certain of our interpretation.  We do know that the dominant view’s construction of referral 
homophily as independent from particular jobs entails that c and h are properties of the labor market itself 
and not of the jobs from which the referrers engage in their referring behaviors.   
Another way to consider the referral-based implications of the dominant view is to review related 
empirical research. Empirical cases finding that men tend to refer women or that women tend to refer men 
would present a challenge to the dominant view.   
Evidence 
An empirical test of the implicit propositions from the dominant view would require identifying 
the sex of both parts of the referrer-referral applicant dyad for a representative sample of referral 
applicants and job titles within a labor market. Although we found no empirical studies with this specific 
design, there are two5 that are informative. Based on original data surveying job-seekers on the sex of up 
to three referrers who alerted them to job opportunities while the respondents were still employed, Torres 
                                                 
5 A third empirical paper did report same-sex and cross-sex referrals in sex-specific percentages of referrals (Leicht 
and Marx 1997), but did so in a manner such that the same-sex referral probabilities for men and women were not 
calculable. 
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and Huffman (2004) identified the sex-composition of a quasi-representative6 set of referrer-referral 
dyads from a cross-section of white collar jobs in California.  Their survey asked only about job leads, 
with no information as to whether the referral actually applied for the job about which they were alerted 
by the referrer.  Calculations on the data presented by Torres and Huffman (2004) provide estimates of 
the referral homophily parameters P (SSR probability for men) and Q (SSR probability for women) as 
0.79 and 0.53, respectively.  That is, of the dyads where men were the referrers, 79% referred other men; 
and of the dyads with a female referrer, 53% had a female referral.  This finding supports the idea that 
men tend to refer men and women tend to refer women when looking at referrer-referral dyads across 
many different jobs. However, this data cannot assess whether this tendency is robust within job 
categories. 
A second empirical study provides additional insights.  Using data from the 1982 survey of the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Jacqueline Berger (1995) reported the gender-similarity 
of hired referrals and their referrers for the ten most common job titles across the four possibilities of 
male-female dyads.  Here, the referrals were those who had already been hired into the job responding 
with the sex of their referrer.7 The data presented in the paper allows bounded estimates of both referral 
homophily parameters, P and Q, for 5 job titles.8  The dominant view suggests that P and Q should both 
be above 0.5 for all jobs. In addition, the dominant view is consistent with the proposition that the various 
estimates of P should be similar in magnitude across jobs, as well as the same similarity for the various 
estimates of Q.  Table 1 presents the estimates for P and Q derived from Berger's (1995) work. 
The P's and Q's shown in Table 1 challenge both of the propositions from the dominant view.  
First, there are several SSR probabilities that are near or less than 0.5. Across the five jobs, P (SSR 
                                                 
6 The data from this paper have important limitations regarding their generalizability as they were generated by a 
group of white-collar workers in California who elected to join a specific job-search club following a layoff or other 
involuntary unemployment event.  These limitations were noted in the paper (Torres & Huffman, 2004:22-23). 
7 The risk of selection bias from using hired referral applicants instead of all referral applicants is precisely the risk 
that hiring decisions have some sex biases. For a discussion of the pitfalls of using post-hire data to investigate a 
pre-hire phenomenon, see Fernandez and Sosa (2005). 
8 We consider only those jobs for which we could derive an estimate for the number of entries in all four of the 
following categories: women referring women, women referring men, men referring men, and men referring 
women.  In some cases, we used the absence of a job from one of the categories as evidence that there were fewer 
occurrences than the least number in the top ten. 
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probability for men) has a range from below 0.41 (secretary) to greater than 0.89 (miscellaneous machine 
operator).  The range for Q (SSR probability for women)is from 0.49 (janitor, cleaner) to greater than 
0.92 (secretaries). Further, the magnitudes of P and Q appear to vary with the degree to which the 
corresponding jobs are male-dominated or female-dominated. Notably, for female-dominated jobs 
(cashier, secretary), men appear to tend to generate a majority female referrals.  Given this empirical 
challenge to the implications of the dominant view, we sought an alternative operationalization of 
referring dynamics from the referrer’s perspective. 
Alternative view 
Theory 
The dominant view’s formulation of referral hiring and job segregation emphasizes the 
importance of homophilous networks and sets aside the fact that job specific factors also affect gendered 
application rates. Would male referrers naturally generate predominantly male referral applicants for a job 
in a heavily female field such as nursing? Would female referrers naturally generate predominantly 
female referral applicants for a disproportionately male job such as computer programming?  The 
evidence presented in Table 1 from Berger (1995) suggests otherwise.   
The referrer-referral dyad is not merely the referrer and any other individual with whom she 
shares job opportunity information, but the referrer and those individuals who act upon that information 
and become a referral applicant.  This insight is reflected in the following passage where the authors react 
to an earlier statement about the gendered effects of networks in the labor market:  
“For gender, Roos and Reskin (1984, p. 245) provide, ‘With respect to sex segregation, the 
questions of interest are whether the sexes have equal access to personal networks, whether they 
are equally likely to use them, and whether networks are equally effective for women and men.’ It 
is not only a question of having access, but also one of utilizing it and of its eventual success.” 
(Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2000:768, emphasis added) 
Once the referrer-referral dyad is defined as being formed by the application of a referral 
applicant (as is necessary when looking from the perspective of the organization and its referrers), the 
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possibility of job-specific variations in the same-sex referring probabilities P and Q emerges. Notably, 
gendered differences in application rates become relevant when trying to establish the counterfactual 
baseline necessary for defining homophily. 
While there are a multitude of demand-side or organization-based reasons that could affect the 
demographic composition of applicants (Braddock and McPartland 1987; Kmec 2005; O’Farrell and 
Harlan 1984), there are unquestionably supply-side or other organizationally exogenous factors also 
affecting the demographic composition of applicants for different jobs. Job typing (Kmec 2005; Reskin 
1993), job queuing (Moss and Tilly 2001; Reskin and Roos 1990), socialization to gendered career 
aspirations (Marini and Brinton 1984), socio-cultural norms regarding the distribution of domestic versus 
wage labor (Fuwa 2004), rational choice (Rosen 1997), and individual preferences (Okamoto and 
England 1999) are only a few examples of organizationally exogenous factors that might affect the gender 
composition of applicant pools for specific jobs. Some factors are complicated interactions of exogenous 
and endogenous forces. For example, the labor market as a whole influences the wage for any particular 
job, although the individual organization can play a role in wage-setting. The wages of a job, in turn, 
influence the demographic composition of applicants. For our purposes, we need not know precisely why 
men and women do not apply for the same jobs at the same rates, only that this phenomenon exists, and 
that these mechanisms could very well affect the composition of referral applicants in ways similar to 
their effects on non-referral applicants.   
Differential application rates have important implications for the definitions of the same-sex 
referring probabilities P and Q in terms of referral homophily.  The counterfactual composition of referral 
applicants produced by unbiased referring would not be some property of the labor market, but those 
potential referral applicants who survive the filter of the host of supply and demand side mechanisms 
affecting application rates.  Although this composition may be difficult to estimate directly, an easy-to-
measure proxy exists for most organizations: the population of non-referral applicants.   




Researchers Fernandez and Sosa (2005) first offered this insight that non-referral applicants could 
serve as the appropriate baseline for comparison when evaluating referral homophily.  The idea is that 
formal recruitment methods are likely to be less biased than referral recruitment (Braddock & 
McPartland, 1987; Reskin, McBrier & Kmec, 1999), and provide an indicator of the likely composition of 
the counterfactual applicant pool produced by unbiased referral recruitment. The composition of non-
referral applicants then provides an indicator of the net effect of all the forces except referring that result 
in gendered application rates. 
The empirical findings presented (Fernandez and Sosa 2005:878, Table 3) were consistent with 
their argument.  We reproduce the relevant elements of their table here as Table 2a, and indicate how their 
empirical case corresponds to a specification of referral homophily parameters P and Q, as well as their 
constructors, c and h.  We note that the empirically-observed values for both P and Q (43.7% and 75.1%, 
respectively) may be generated using the percent female among non-referral applicants (65%) as the value 
of c, and about 10 percentage points (9.4±0.7) as the homophily adjustment h. We also note that this 
finding presents another empirical case challenging the dominant view in that the male referrers did not 
generate a majority male group of referral applicants. 
Seeking to replicate this finding, we constructed a similar table using a dataset taken from a 
different empirical setting. (For a detailed discussion of this setting, see Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 
2006:47-51).9  We present the findings here as Table 3b. Again the empirically-observed values for both 
P and Q (men’s SSR probability: 55.7% and women’s SSR probability: 68.2%, respectively) may be 
generated using the percent female among non-referral applicants (57.4%) as the counterfactual 
composition c parameter, and a homophily adjustment h of about 12 percentage points (11.95±1.15). 
                                                 
9 Note that this additional dataset is not restricted to a single job-title, but rather represents all of the applicants to the 
multiple entry-level jobs in this firm.  Applicants did not apply to specific jobs, but rather just applied to work at the 
firm. So even from the referrer’s perspective, referrers would generate referral applicants for an entry-level job 
application, and not for a specific job. 
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In the referral homophily data from Fernandez and Sosa (2005), we can see that both men and 
women generated referral applicants that were more similar by sex relative to the baseline of non-referral 
applicants. In that case, the homophily adjustment was approximately 10 percentage points for both men 
and women. Our attempt to replicate this finding in Table 3b reveals a similar positive homophily 
adjustment for men and women, this time of approximately 12 percentage points (13 points for women, 
11 points for men).  In both cases, we find support for referral homophily, but this homophily must be 
viewed from the appropriate baseline: in the ideal case, applicants from unbiased referring, but in the 
practical case, non-referral applicants. 
In casting the referral process in terms of the referrer and from the perspective of the 
organization, we have identified this conflict in defining referral homophily.  The dominant view claims 
that male referrers generate more male referrals and female referrers generate more female referrals in a 
manner independent of the particular job.   This view is supported by a variety of theoretical claims in the 
literature, but is challenged by some empirical findings.  An alternative view, using non-referral 
applicants as a proxy for the counterfactual baseline to assess referral homophily, claims homophily acts 
as an adjusting factor to job-specific application rates. These distinctions have crucial implications for the 
segregating effects of referring, as we will show in the next section. 
The model 
We conceptualize referring as an example of a population process – that is, a process by which 
the current population generates new members of the population.  Here, the population is job holders, and 
the reproductive process is referring.  Indeed this analogy to population dynamics prompted Rosabeth 
Moss Kanter to coin the term “homosocial reproduction” (1977: 63) in referring to the informal processes 
by which male managers maintained the gender composition of their jobs. 
Our model makes use of a common analytical tool applied to population processes, namely a 
Markov process (Keyfitz and Caswell 2005; Kingman, 1969).  Although the sociological literature has 
seen a wide application of Markov models for social processes particularly in the area of social mobility 
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(cf. Singer and Spilerman 1976:1), there are a number of examples of modeling labor market processes as 
Markov processes (Lieberson and Fugitt 1967; Montgomery 1994).  There is even a recent paper 
specifically using a Markov model to investigate the association between referring and job segregation 
(Tassier 2005).10   
Basic functioning and Dynamics 
First, consider a one-job organization composed of men and women who generate the next 
generation of organizational members through referring.  The percent male among new organizational 
members generated by men is P, and 1 – P of the men-generated members are female. The percent female 
among new organizational members generated by women is Q, and 1 – Q of the women-generated new 
members are male.  These proportions allow us to define a transition matrix M giving the male and 
female composition of referrals entering the job as generated by the referring behaviors of the employees 
already in the job. The transition matrix M is defined in equation (1) below, and the corresponding 








  (1)  
The simplest application of this transition matrix assumes that referring is the only route for 
recruitment, every job holder refers, that all referral applicants are hired, and each new generation of hired 
applicants completely replaces the previous generation. We explore this highly restricted model to 
cultivate an intuition for the dynamics.  Then, we will relax many of these unrealistic assumptions. 
                                                 
10 That particular model makes the explicit assumption that contact networks are perfectly segregated, thus P and Q 
would both equal 1.  The resulting analysis finds associations between referring and segregation only when looking 
across firms within industries.  Research has shown that segregation increases with the level of specificity up to the 
level of the job (Bayard et al. 2003; Jacobs 2001; Kmec 2003), and our outcome of concern is job segregation.  As a 
result, this previous analysis and its associated assumptions are not directly germane to our study. 
11 We note that we are modeling this population process as a first-order Markov process; that is, a memoryless 
process where the sex of the referral is not influenced by the sex of the referrer's referrer.  This implementation 
choice is largely one of erring on the side of simplicity.  As a testament to the under-theorized and under-researched 
nature of referring dynamics, we could find neither theoretical nor empirical statements addressing whether or not 
such second-order influences might exist. Further, the temporal dynamics of our model are tantamount to a job 
where prior to time zero, the job has recruited applicants via unbiased referring only, and at time zero, the types of 
homophily biases observed in referral recruiting switches on. The change in percent female from time zero on is the 
necessary the result of the modeled homophily in referring processes and no others. 
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We define jt to be a 2-element column vector (men, women) consisting of the count of men and 
women in a single job at time t. The initial count of men and women within the job is given by j0.  The 
matrix product Mjt gives the count of men and women in the job's next generation, jt+1. Each application 
of the transition matrix to the job's latest generation returns the next generation.  If there is some job 
composition j* such that Mj* = j*, then the job is at an equilibrium defined by the transition matrix.  This 
equilibrium composition, j* is called a fixed column vector of M. The fixed column vector is by definition 
the eigenvector of M when M has an eigenvalue equal to one (Grinstead and Snell 1997). 
Our definition of the transition matrix mathematically entails that one is an eigenvalue, for any 
possible values of P and Q  (proof in appendix).  Therefore, the transition matrix M, defined by the 
proportion of same-sex referral applicants generated by male and female referrers, determines the 
equilibrium composition of the job.  Thus, there will always be an equilibrium job composition, and that 
composition is completely determined by the parameters P and Q. 
As a result, we can write formulas for the equilibrium percent female of the job, denoted by f* and 












1*  (3) 
Equivalence under less stringent assumptions 
This initial representation of the referral process from the perspective of an organization makes a 
number of drastic assumptions. First, referring is the sole source of new organizational members. Second, 
all job holders engage in referring. All referral applicants are hired, and each new generation of job 
holders completely replaces the previous generation.  
Does the convenient analytical solution to our model hold when we relax some of our 
constraining assumptions? We modify the transition matrix to relax all assumptions but the first. Because 
we are interested in elucidating referral processes, modeling a system where referrals are the sole source 
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of applicants helps to highlight referring dynamics.12 We introduce three new parameters: r is the 
proportion of organizational members engaging in referring, s is the selection-for-hire rate of referral 
applicants, and x is the exit rate of current organizational members. Each of these three new parameters 
may take values from 0 to 1, inclusive.  With the addition of these parameters, the transition matrix can 
account for less-than-universal referring, less-than-universal hiring of applicants, and employee retention 
as well as turnover. The modified transition matrix is defined in equation (4) below, and the 









Although the introduction of these parameters can change M's eigenvalues, it does not change the 
equilibrium eigenvector, j* (proof in appendix). With the possibility of an eigenvalue other than 1, the 
equilibrium relation becomes Mj*=λj*, where λ is the largest eigenvalue of M. Consider the meaning of λ 
being other than one.  When the composition of the job is j*, the composition of the job at the next time 
step will be λj*.  When λ is greater than 1, the job will still have the same proportion of male and female 
employees, but the total population will increase by the scaling factor λ.  Similarly, when λ < 1, the total 
population of the job decreases as determined by λ, but the proportion male and female remains the same.   
Thus, we see that this new set of parameters does not change the equilibrium percent men and 
women of the job, only the job’s size (which either grows to infinity or shrinks to zero depending on the 
value of λ).   When rs=x, the job is stable, neither growing nor shrinking, so when rs=x, 1 will always be 
an eigenvalue of M. So even with this more inclusive transition matrix, there is an equilibrium in the 
percent female and male in the job, completely determined by referral homophily parameters P and Q, 
and given by the same formulas (2) and (3) from above.  Rather than affecting the final equilibrium 
percent female and male in the job, the three parameters r, s, and x simply affect how quickly the job 
reaches that equilibrium. 
                                                 
12 In a separate paper, we use an agent-based model to compare the segregating effects of referring with those of 
screening bias.  We find that for a large swath of the labor market referring can have segregating effects comparable 
to or even exceeding those of empirically documented screening bias levels (Rubineau and Fernandez 2006). 
Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
18 
 
Identifying the equilibrium composition of the job resulting from referral processes reveals the 
direction of the effect of referring on the composition of a particular job. For example, if a job's initial 
(male, female) composition is (100, 100) and the equilibrium composition determined by the transition 
matrix is (150, 50), we can say referring acts to make the job more male.  Similarly, if the equilibrium 
composition is (80, 120), we can say referring acts to make the job more female. We do not claim that 
referral processes will bring the job to that equilibrium position.  Rather, we use the equilibrium position 
relative to the original composition of the job to reveal the direction of the effects of referring.13 
It is important to note that the new parameters assume unbiased selection and turnover as well as 
the same rates of referring for men and for women.  If selection or turnover rates were biased such that 
there were sex differences net all other individual characteristics, this would be a clear example of 
discrimination.  Our model begins with the ideal job where these biases have been eliminated.  As a 
result, any and all segregation observed may be attributable to referring processes – the focus of our 
study.  Later in this paper, we will relax the assumption regarding equal rates of referring for male and 
female job holders. Because the different definitions of M do not affect our outcome of interest, job 
segregation, we proceed using the simpler version of the transition matrix defined in equation (1). 
Analysis 
Analysis of the Dominant View of Referring Dynamics 
As discussed above, the dominant view holds that P and Q are both above 0.5 and independent of 
job-specific factors.  We now explore the consequences of this view in terms of our model. 
If P and Q are set in the labor market and not influenced by job-specific factors, then this yields a 
single transition matrix M for the entire labor market. Given this single transition matrix M applying to all 
jobs in the labor market, and the fact that the equilibrium composition of the job j* is independent of the 
initial composition of the job, it follows that the dominant view entails that referring processes push all 
jobs in the labor market to the same final job composition j*.   
                                                 
13 In fact, the dynamics of the model are to monotonically approach the equilibrium composition (Grinstead & Snell, 
1997: 449) and do so very quickly – in geometric time (Bremaud 1991:136). 
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We can see this result mathematically if we consider a labor market composed of N jobs, the 
composition of each job at time t is given by a column vector jit (i=1..N) consisting of the number of men 
and number of women on that particular job at that particular time.  The 2-by-N matrix Jt gives the 
composition of all jobs in the labor market at time t. The transition matrix M is defined as before. Given 
this modified construction, and because the same transition matrix M applies to all jobs, it is easy to see 
that MJt = Jt+1.  Iterating through the generations through repeated applications of the transition matrix 
results in an eventual equilibrium J* where all the column vectors comprising J* are equal to j*.  Thus a 
single transition matrix for the entire labor market has the result that referral processes push all jobs 
towards the same equilibrium composition. 
We now consider some other specifications of the transition matrix M and their resulting 
equilibrium compositions.  First, if P=Q=1 (both men and women generate exclusively same-sex referral 
applicants), the final percent female (and male) for the labor market are undefined based on equations (2) 
and (3).  In fact, in this case of perfect homophily for both men and women, all jobs exactly reproduce 
themselves with each generation.  In this extreme case, J*=J0.  Although this result allows the dominant 
view to have a result where referring preserves the segregation of jobs, we reject the explanatory success 
of this extreme case. There is neither empirical evidence supporting nor strong theoretical claim for the 
idea that perfect homophily is a reasonable characterization of actual referral dynamics in the labor 
market. Rather, none of the empirical settings we have examined has exhibited perfect homophily.  Note 
also that if only one of P or Q equals 1, and the other is anything less than 1, then the equilibrium is the 
corner solution where the job goes to all male or all female, respectively. 
Another necessary result from equations (2) and (3) is that whenever referral homophily 
parameters P and Q are equal to each other (men and women have the same probability for generating 
same-sex referral applicants), and in the range (0,1), exclusive, the final percent female (and male) is 
50%.  Even when both P and Q are above 0.5, as the dominant view suggests is a requirement for 
referring to segregate, if they are equal, even some arbitrarily high value such as 0.95, the result of 
Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
20 
 
referring will be to integrate all jobs in the labor market.  This result is directly contrary to the prevailing 
wisdom regarding the consequences of referring.  Still, this is the necessary result of referring dynamics.   
This surprising and counterintuitive result may be made clear with an illustration.  Consider an 
all-male job, and same-sex referring probabilities of 0.95 for both men and women. Although these men 
generate referrals who are 95% men, 5% are women, making the job more female than the initial 
composition.  These men continue to generate referrals who are 95% men and 5% women, so the referrals 
from men are always a little less male than the composition of the referring men.  At the same time, the 
new women on the job generate referrals who are 95% women and 5% men.  At each step, the job 
becomes more female than before.  This process continues, but cannot make the job all-women or even 
female-dominated.  The majority group will continue to generate members of the minority, who 
themselves increase their relative composition.  The equilibrium position for these dynamics is an exactly 
equal composition of men and women.  At this point, for each new female referral generated by women, 
there is a new male referral generated by men, and vice-versa.  This structural solution is very similar to 
an earlier analysis showing that the prevailing wisdom concerning the reproduction of gendered norms of 
nurturing could not in fact explain that outcome (Jackson 1989). 
When P and Q are not equal to each other, the final percent female may be something other than 
50%. Whatever the final composition, all jobs in the labor market – both male-dominated and female-
dominated – move towards this final point. Whenever P is greater than Q (men have a higher probability 
of producing same-sex referral applicants than women), all jobs drawing upon the labor market are moved 
towards a majority male equilibrium.  Necessarily, this implies that referring acts to integrate all female-
dominated jobs in the labor market. In addition, any jobs that are more male-dominated than the 
equilibrium majority male composition will be made less male-dominated through the operation of 
referral processes. In fact, the only jobs in the labor market that would be further segregated from 
referring would be those slightly male-dominated jobs that are between 50% male and the equilibrium 
composition.   
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We see analogous results when P is less than Q, and all jobs in the market are moved towards a 
majority female equilibrium. In this case, referring acts to integrate all male-dominated jobs and jobs 
more female-dominated than the equilibrium.   This finding suggests that the dominant view entails that 
although referring can segregate some relatively integrated jobs, referring tends to integrate most jobs in 
the labor market. That is, a female-dominated equilibrium entails that referring acts as an integrating force 
for all male-dominated jobs and for those female-dominated jobs that are more segregated than the 
equilibrium point. Necessarily, the dominant view’s explanation of referral processes cannot realistically 
result in dynamics which simultaneously maintain the segregation of male-dominated and female-
dominated jobs.  Figure 2 presents graphically this tendency of referral processes as defined by the 
dominant view to integrate most jobs in the labor market for an arbitrary equilibrium composition (35% 
female, 65% male).  In Figure 2, we see that referring acts as an integrating force for all the female-
dominated jobs and for those male-dominated jobs that are more male-dominated than the equilibrium 
composition (jobs are represented as dots on a line giving the continuum of possible initial job 
compositions).  The only jobs that are segregated through referring processes are those that are slightly 
male-dominated, but less male-dominated than the equilibrium composition.  The grayed portion of the 
continuum of jobs experience referring as an integrating force, while jobs in the smaller white portion of 
the continuum experience referring as a segregating mechanism.   
Our analysis of the consequences of the dominant view of referring dynamics regarding job 
segregation leads us to reject this formulation of referring dynamics.  Under this framework, unless 
referral homophily is in all cases perfect, referring not only cannot maintain levels of job segregation, but 
referring would actually serve as an integrating force for the majority of the jobs in the labor market. We 
now turn to a similar analysis of the alternative view of referral dynamics, predicated on referral 
dynamics being contingent upon job-specific factors. 
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Analysis of the Alternative View 
Whereas the dominant view was consistent with an explanation of referral homophily that left no 
role for organizational influence, the alternative view defines referral homophily explicitly as a function 
of job-specific factors.  Whereas the dominant view focused on homophily in the ties between referrers 
and job-seekers, the alternative view focuses on homophily in the ties between referrers and successful 
referrals (using again the words of Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2000: 768) – that is those alters who 
survive the many gendered filters prior to job application and actually become a job applicant. The 
counterfactual percent female of applicants produced by unbiased referring, c, must be the net gendering 
effect of all pre-application labor market forces except referring.  Naturally, some job-specific factors are 
included in this broad set of mechanisms.  
Whereas the invariance of P and Q across the labor market in the dominant view allowed the use 
of a single transmission matrix, M for the entire labor market, the alternative view does not allow this 
wholesale treatment.  Specifically, each job has its own counterfactual composition of non-referral 
applicants, the percent female of which is denoted by c.  If we have N jobs, then we indicate the job-
specific nature of our model parameters using again the index i (i=1..N).  This alternative view of the 
labor market suggests that each job has its own transition matrix, Mi, composed of job-specific values of 
Pi and Qi, which are the result of the equations Pi = 1 – ci + h, and Qi = ci + h.  
Our knowledge of the structuring of the homophily adjustment parameter, h, is limited by the 
evidence from our two empirical cases presented in Table 2a and Table 2b.14  Although in neither of the 
empirical cases were the observed h for men exactly equal to the h for women, we do not have the data to 
test for significant differences in these values.  In both cases, the sex-specific deviations (±0.7 and ±1.15) 
from the mean value of h (9.4 and 11.95) were small relative to that mean value – less than 10% (7.4% 
and 9.6%, respectively).  Because we lack clear evidence supporting sex asymmetries in the homophily 
                                                 
14 In the context of our model, there are two ways we could have h vary: by job or by sex.  Because ci is intended to 
capture all of the job-specific sex biasing effects of recruitment except biased (homophilous) referring, we do not 
have h vary by job.  In fact, we suggest that the arguments used in the dominant view are more appropriately applied 
solely to the homophily adjustment to referring, rather than referring as a whole. 
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adjustment, because we wish to avoid attributing a potentially significant causal role to a new and 
uninvestigated parameter, and because modeling h as invariant to sex is more parsimonious, we proceed 
with our analysis setting h as a constant (and explore the implications of this choice later in the paper).  
Evaluating whether this choice is an accurate one requires future empirical research.   
Given our operationalizations of ci and h, we can rewrite the transition matrix Mi as in equation 
(5), with the analogous Markov diagram again provided in Figure 1a (using the initial P and Q notation). 






  (5) 
The eigenvector of Mi when the eigenvalue is 1 defines ji*, which we can use to determine the equilibrium 















  (6) 
The denominator in equation (6) imposes the constraint that h ≠ 0.5. This result is a carry-over from our 
definition of P and Q in terms of ci and h along with the restriction that P and Q are limited to values in 
the range: (0,1).  
One of the first implications of equation (6) is that when there is no homophily adjustment to 
referring (h=0), the final percent female on the job equals the percent female from the population of non-
referral applicants (fi* = ci). That is, the slope15 associated with the counterfactual ci in yielding the final 
percent female of the job, fi*, is exactly one. In a job where all other bias has been eliminated, this is the 
sensible result.  
A second consequence of equation (6) is that when the counterfactual composition of non-referral 
applicants is 50:50 (ci = 0.5), then the equilibrium composition is 50% female for all possible values of h.  
That is, any level of homophilous (or heterophilous) referring will still generate a 50:50 equilibrium 
                                                 
15 The final percent female on the job, fi*, is linear with ci, with a slope of 1/(1-2h). The intercept (-h/(1-2h)) adjusts 
such that ci = 0.5 is a kind of pivot point, present for all the solution lines relating fi* and ci.  A few solution lines for 
this formula are presented graphically in Figure 3. 
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composition for a job that has perfect parity in its counterfactual (where unbiased referring generates a 
50:50 composition of applicants).   
As Figure 3 illustrates, when h is positive (a positive homophily adjustment), the slope relating fi* 
and ci is greater than one (and approaches infinity as h approaches 0.5).  This means that when ci > 0.5 
(the counterfactual composition is female-dominated), fi* > ci, or that the job is becoming more female.  
When ci < 0.5 (male-dominated), fi* < ci, that is, the job becomes more male. This behavior is precisely 
that which is commonly understood in associations between referring and segregation: male-dominated 
jobs remain or become more male, and female-dominated jobs remain or become more female.  We see 
that the alternative view, with its job-specific formulation of referring dynamics, is able to generate 
consistently segregating effects from referral processes. 
Figure 3 also depicts the effects of heterophily, or when the biasing component of referrer-referral 
tie formation encourages cross-sex ties.16  We represent heterophily using negative values of h.  This 
heterophily has the effect of dampening the slope relating fi* and ci. Specifically, for all negative values of 
h, the slope relating fi* and ci remains positive, but approaches zero as h approaches negative infinity.  So 
heterophily alone can serve to lessen the segregation of a job, but cannot change a male-dominated job to 
a female-dominated one or vice-versa.  The increasingly negative values of h shown in Figure 3 reveal 
this dampening effect on the slope. 
Our analysis reveals that this alternative view, with job-specific variations in the structuring of 
referral processes, is successful in explaining the segregating effects of referring. If the segregating effects 
of referring depend on job-varying factors, then it is reasonable to consider the job or firm as a primary 
target for efforts seeking to eliminate these segregating effects. Previous literature has emphasized the 
importance or desirability of limiting, or to the extent possible, eliminating informal recruitment via 
referrals to prevent its segregating effects (e.g., Braddock and McPartland 1987, Reskin and McBrier 
2000). If these recommendations were based on the false assumption that the segregating effects of 
                                                 
16 See Heckathorn and Jeffri (2001:312) for empirical examples of heterophily in the referral recruitment scenario of 
sampling the hard-to-measure population of HIV+ individuals. 
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referring are exogenous to the firm, perhaps there have been overlooked opportunities for intervention.  In 
the next section, we extend our model to accommodate some empirical findings, and identify an 
opportunity for organizations to manage the segregating effects of referring. 
Tipping Points 
We mentioned above that sex biases in hiring, exit, or referring behaviors could change the 
equilibrium composition from our analyses.  We explained why hiring and exit biases are beyond the 
scope of our current analysis, but referring behaviors certainly is germane to our analysis.  So far, we 
have made an implicit assumption that men and women are equally likely to engage in referring. (We note 
that Tassier’s [2005:236] Markov model of referring and labor market segregation makes this identical 
assumption.) Is this assumption warranted? 
There have been several empirical studies showing that referring behavior can vary significantly 
by sex and race (Elliott 2001; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006; Fernandez and Sosa 2005). In 
addition to the empirical evidence, there is a large body of indirect theoretical support for sex 
asymmetries in referring behavior.17 The theoretical claim is not necessarily for any particular direction in 
the asymmetry, but that consistent male-female parity in referring would be surprising.  In this section we 
relax this earlier assumption and explore the implications of sex asymmetries in referring. 
We implement sex asymmetries in referring rates by adding a new parameter to our model, asymir . 
The male referring rate becomes ri – asymir , and the female referring rate becomes ri + 
asym
ir .18 This 
formulation allows the referring rates for males and females to be distinct: ri becomes the central 
tendency of referring for job i (i.e., the unweighted average of the male and female referring rates), while 
                                                 
17 In the realm of behavior within the organization, examples of sex differences in network structure include 
instrumental and social support networks (Ibarra 1992, 1997; Stackman and Pinder 1999) and peer and mentoring 
relationships (Ely 1994; McGuire 2000, 2002). Beyond organizations, researchers have found sex-specific 
homophily effects in recruitment to Injection Drug Use (IDU) (Heckathorn 2002), in telephone usage (Smoreda and 
Licoppe 2000), and in socializing behavior among school-aged children (Hanish et al. 2005; Kiesner, Poulin and 
Nicotra 2003; Nangle et al. 2004). 
18 The choice of which is the result of addition and which of subtraction is unimportant. We chose this convention 
because of the empirical case finding that females referred more than males (Fernandez and Sosa 2005). 




ir  is the difference between the female referring rate and ri. We make 
asym
ir  job-specific because there 
is empirical evidence of job-specific variation in this asymmetry.  Although Fernandez and Sosa (2005) 
found significant sex differences in referring rates, Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006) found no such 
significant differences (although they did find significant difference in the referring rates by racial 
categories). When asymir  > 0, women tend to refer more than men, and when 
asym
ir  < 0, men refer more 
than women, and when asymir =0, there is no difference in the referring rates of men and women. Using 
this new parameter, we define a modified transition matrix, Mirasym below in equation (7); also illustrated 



















The ji* equilibrium composition entailed by Mirasym still allows the calculation of a closed-form 
solution for the final percent female in the job at equilibrium, fi*, albeit a much more complicated one. 
The equilibrium percent female is now a function of four parameters rather than two.  As a shorthand 
(with the full equation available in the appendix), we denote the function giving fi* from the four 
parameters as g, written: fi*= g(ri , asymir , ci , h).  When 
asym
ir =0, the system reduces to that which we have 
already described, such that fi*= g(ri , asymir =0 , ci , h)=(ci-h)/(1-2h).  We illustrate the dynamics of g first 
by holding two parameters constant: ri – the central tendency for referring, which we set at 0.25, and ci – 
the counterfactual percent female among non-referral applicants, set to 0.65 (female-dominated).19  Figure 
4 graphs fi*= g(ri =0.25 , asymir , ci =0.65 , h), and adds a dotted plane at the 0.65 level to help indicate 
deviations from the counterfactual. 
Figure 4 has several important and notable characteristics. First, when the homophily adjustment 
is zero (i.e., when the gender distribution of referrals equals the counterfactual gender distribution of non-
referral applicants), the final percent female still equals the counterfactual percent female, and sex 
                                                 
19 These settings are approximately what was recorded in the empirical case study presented in Fernandez and Sosa 
(2005). 
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asymmetries in referring rates have no effect on the final percent female. The line giving the final percent 
female when the homophily adjustment is zero is parallel to the riasym axis.  This finding is logically 
consistent. When the homophily adjustment equals zero, then referring is completely unbiased with 
regard to sex, so it should not matter whether men or women are referring more, and any such differences 
should not have any effect on the final percent female of the job. 
As the homophily adjustment increases, the behavior becomes more complex. Most of the surface 
of Figure 4 is above the dotted plane, indicating that for most values of riasym and h, referring tends to push 
this female-dominated job towards an even more female-dominated equilibrium.  But riasym has a 
transformative influence on these segregating effects of referring. Note the portion of the surface that is 
below the dotted plane.  When riasym is very negative, this female-dominated job becomes less female 
through the action of referral processes. Increasing h amplifies both the segregating and integrating 
effects of referring for a given level of riasym.  Importantly, note the intersection of the surface with the 
dotted plane, indicated with a line on the surface at the 0.65 level.  This intersection, indicating the 
transition point where changes to riasym results in either segregation or integration, is a straight line. That 
is, referring needs some level of homophily adjustment for referring to segregate or integrate, but this 
critical value for riasym , which determines whether referring will have a segregating or integrating effect, 
is the same all values of h. We call this critical value the tipping point for the segregating effect of 
referring.  When riasym is greater than the tipping point, referring serves to make the job more female, and 
when riasym is less than the tipping point, referring serves to make the job more male.  At the critical 
tipping point value of riasym itself, referring is neutral to segregation. 
So far, this revelation of the tipping point has been achieved in the context of holding constant 
two of the four parameters of the function g. How does variation in these other two parameters affect the 
tipping point?  Because the tipping point is the value of where fi* = ci, we can re-write g to solve for the 
tipping point: ci = g(ri , asymir , ci , h), and solve for riasym.  Denoting this critical tipping point value riasym of 
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as tp, it is clear that tp will be some function k such that tp = k(ri  , ci , h) where (h>0). Solving for this 
function k, we find the formula for the tipping point of referring, given in equation (8) below.   
 tp = ri (1 – 2ci)  (8) 
As we observed in Figure 4, the tipping point is in fact independent of h. Still, h cannot equal zero for 
either segregation or integration to occur.20  An actual firm can easily calculate the tipping point for a job. 
The tipping point depends only upon the mean rate of referring in the job, ri (calculable by a firm taking 
the quotient of total number of job holders generating referral applicants divided by the total number of 
job holders eligible to generate referral applicants), and the percent female among the counterfactual 
population of non-referral applicants, ci (calculable by a firm by documenting the percent female among 
non-referral applicants to a job). Given that referrer behaviors are within the realm of organizational 
influence, the identification of this tipping point for the segregating effects of referring presents an 
important new tool for organizations.  If a firm can promote referring behavior among the minority group 
past the tipping point level, then referral processes can serve to integrate the job, rather than segregate. 
The policy of managing the behavior of referrers leverages existing homophily dynamics to counter job 
segregation. 
 Our analysis first explored the consequences of the dominant view of referring dynamics, and 
showed that this prevailing wisdom cannot explain how referring contributes to job segregation.  When 
reconceptualizing the referral process from the perspective of the organizationally-based referrers, we 
identified an alternative view for structuring referral homophily in terms of job-specific factors.  Not only 
was this alternative view more supported by published empirical findings, but it also successfully 
generates the kind of segregation dynamics that the literature has sought to explain. Resolving this 
implicit debate in the manner of structuring referral homophily, we expanded our model to incorporate 
empirical findings that referring rates may differ by sex.  Through this additional analysis, we reveal that 
referring dynamics have a tipping point in referrer behaviors defined as a critical value of the sex 
                                                 
20 We note that this independence renders our decision to model h as not being job-specific somewhat moot; had we 
modeled h as a job-specific parameter, hi, the results would be the same. 
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asymmetry in referring.  Before reaching the tipping point, referring segregates as is commonly 
understood.  At the tipping point, referring is neutral to segregation, and beyond the tipping point, 
referring can serve to integrate a job.  We identified the formula for the tipping point, and demonstrated 
how firms could easily calculate the tipping point for their own jobs using data commonly available from 
hiring departments.  In short, we have upended the prevailing wisdom regarding the association between 
referring and job segregation and introduced a more complete explanation of the phenomenon.  We have 
also identified opportunities for firms to manage referrers so as to preserve referring as a practice but 
eliminate its segregating effects. 
Discussion 
Model Robustness 
Our goal has been to elucidate the segregating effects of referral processes.  We have used a 
Markov population process model for this purpose, but want to ensure our findings are an outcome of the 
actual dynamics we model, and not merely a result of our choices for model structure.  In this section, we 
explore the robustness of our model to our modeling assumptions and model structure.  Two noted 
assumptions of our model are that the homophily adjustment parameter h is sex-invariant, and that our 
percent female in the counterfactual parameter c is determined by the job but does not change with the 
composition of the job itself.  Our chosen model structure has been a discrete-time Markov model.  We 
test the robustness of our findings in the context of each of these choices in turn. 
Sex-invariance of h 
One notable assumption was that our homophily adjustment parameter, h, was sex-invariant.  We 
lack the empirical data necessary to establish whether the observed values of h for men and women in our 
two cases (Tables 2a and 2b) vary significantly by sex.  Our main analysis proceeded under the 
assumption of sex-invariance to avoid placing causal importance on a relative uninvestigated parameter.  
Our analysis then identified the tipping point phenomenon that serves as the paper’s main finding.  Do we 
still find a tipping point if we relax the sex-invariance assumption? In short, yes. 
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We modify our model to allow for sex-varying homophily adjustment just was we did to allow 
for sex-varying referring rates.  We introduce a new parameter, hasym, to capture the sex-asymmetry in 
homophily adjustment, and write the homophily adjustment parameter term for women as h + hasym and 
the homophily adjustment term for men as h – hasym.  Comparing this operationalization with the empirical 
findings in Tables 2a and 2b, we can see that in the former case, h = 9.4 and hasym = 0.7; and in the latter 
case, h = 11.95 and hasym = -1.15.  Although this variation hasym in could be a result of random noise, it 
could also reflect some underlying differences in the two cases.  Using this modified model, we see how 
variation in hasym could affect our calculation of a job’s tipping point.   
Although the job still has a tipping point, the new formula for the tipping point is no longer 
independent of h.  It is now a function of four parameters: r, c, h, and hasym.  This new formula is given 










It is easy to see that when hasym = 0, equation (9) reduces to the original formula for the tipping point, 
equation (8).  Does this dependence on h and hasym undermine our presentation of an easy-to-calculate 
tipping point?  Certainly, it is more difficult for a firm to calculate its own h and hasym along with r and c 
than simply to calculate r and c alone.  We present Figure 5 to illustrate the affect hasym has on changing 
the calculated tipping point.  Figure 5 graphs a new function, Δ(r,c,h, hasym) defined as the difference 
between equations (8) and (9).   For any values of its four parameters, Δ gives the difference between the 
tipping point calculation under the sex-invariant assumption (8) and the tipping point calculation allowing 
non-random sex-variance (9). 
 Because Δ is a formula with four parameters, its graphic representation presents a minor 
challenge.  Using two parameters as independent axes, and fixed values for the other two parameters, we 
can make a surface graph of Δ.  By observing how changes in the fixed values change the surface, we can 
show how all four parameters affect the change in the tipping point calculation. Because our focus is the 
new parameter hasym, we set that parameter as one of the axes.  For the other axis, we use the percent 
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female in the counterfactual of non-referral applicants, c, to demonstrate the effects of hasym across the 
spectrum of male-dominated to female-dominated jobs.  We vary the other two parameters, r and h, in a 
two-by-two table, providing the structure for Figure 5. 
 All four graphed surfaces of Δ in Figure 5 share the same surface shape, save for variation in the 
vertical scale of the surfaces.  Two observations follow immediately from Figure 5: that as jobs are more 
segregated (as reflected by counterfactual parameter c approaching 0 or 1), the hasym parameter has a 
diminishing effect on the calculation of the tipping point.  Similarly, the hasym parameter has the greatest 
effect for jobs with parity (i.e., 50:50) in their counterfactual applicant composition. The other two 
variables, r and h, do not alter these relationships; they only serve to scale the magnitude of their effects.  
Increasing the referring rate, r, serves to magnify the effects of hasym linearly – doubling r doubles the 
value of Δ, shown by comparing the two pairs of surface graphs in the same columns of Figure 5.  
Increasing the value of h decreases the effect of hasym on the tipping point, as shown by comparing the two 
pairs of surface graphs in the same rows of Figure 5. 
 In those jobs for which promoting integration is the most important – highly segregated jobs – the 
hasym parameter has the smallest effect, and firms can reasonably use the simpler equation (8).  For other 
jobs, the hasym parameter may render the actual tipping harder or easier to attain, depending on the sign of 
hasym, but this deviation is likely to be large only in firms with high levels of referring and that are close to 
being integrated already.  Firms wishing a more accurate estimate of their own tipping point may use 
equation (9), where they will need to construct homophily tables similar to those in Tables 2a and 2b to 
estimate their h and hasym parameters.  In most cases, the simpler equation for the tipping point (8) should 
provide a close estimate sufficient to inform organizational efforts.   
Setting the counterfactual as a job-specific constant 
Our model has assumed that the counterfactual composition of non-referral applicants is constant 
for each job; specifically, that this counterfactual composition does not vary with the actual composition 
of the job. It is possible that the current composition of the job affects the composition of applicants 
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including the counterfactual composition of applicants that would be generated by unbiased referring.  
Indeed such a mechanism has been proposed as a one that may contribute to the sex segregation of jobs 
(Reskin, McBrier & Kmec, 1999:351). Empirical research supporting the existence of this mechanism is 
limited (we identified only Martin, 1990:498 - referenced in Reskin, McBrier & Kmec, 1999). Adding 
this additional feedback loop to our model, where the counterfactual is a function of the current (or 
lagged) job composition, would result in the undesirably extreme behavior. That is, jobs that are 
compositionally majority male - however slight that majority, would have an equilibrium composition of 
100% male, and any job with a majority female composition would become 100% female at equilibrium.  
The only jobs that would avoid these two corner solutions would be those that begin at exactly a 50:50 
male:female composition.  
Although the dynamics resulting from this modification to the model are trivial, the actual model 
structure changes significantly because a model parameter becomes a function of the current state of the 
model, changing the Markov process from a homogeneous model to a non-homogeneous (i.e., the 
transition probabilities vary with time) one.  Since we are not adopting this modification, we present only 
a numerical/graphical analysis of the implications of this additional feedback. Figure 6a shows the 
modeled percent female over time in a model where the counterfactual composition depends upon the 
current job composition for five different initial compositions of the job (75%, 51%, 50%, 49%, and 25% 
female).  Each of these paths leads to an equilibrium of 100% female, 0% female or remaining exactly 
50%.  In this model, there are no other solutions to this model.  Compare this result to that illustrated in 
Figure 6b - the same five job lines using our model with an invariant counterfactual.  Referring still 
segregates in the direction of the majority, but in a more muted fashion and with a distinct equilibrium for 
each job line.  It is clear that when trying to understand the dynamics by which referring segregates, we 
prefer the model that is both simpler and that yields non-trivial solution sets. 
Most importantly regarding the robustness of our model, even had we adopted this additional 
feedback to our model, the calculated value for the tipping point would not change.  At the tipping point, 
the equilibrium composition of the job would equal the counterfactual composition of the job.  Below the 
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tipping point, the job would have a final percent female of 0%, and above the tipping  point, the job 
would have a final percent female of 100%. 
Discrete-time Markov model structure 
To ensure that our choice of using a discrete-time Markov model was not the source of our 
results, we developed an analogous continuous-time model using as system of differential equations. This 
model produced mathematically identical results.21 Thus, we are confident that our findings are a product 
of referring dynamics as we have defined them, and not merely of the model structure we chose to use to 
present our findings. 
Open empirical questions 
In addition to providing a new understanding of the segregating effects of referring, our analysis 
has revealed a host of new research questions needing resolution to further our understanding of referring 
dynamics.  For example, is referring actually memoryless process?  That is, do the characteristics of one’s 
referrer influence the type of person one is likely to refer? What is the empirical evidence regarding the 
structuring of the homophily adjustment parameter, h?  What are its determinants? Does it vary by job, 
sex, or other demographic characteristics?  How good a proxy for unbiased referring is the population of 
non-referral applicants?  If it is in fact a very good proxy, then firms could pursue a two-pronged 
approach to get towards managing towards the tipping point.  For example, when referring rates are high, 
the tipping point can be large in magnitude. By moving the percent female among non-referral applicants 
towards 50%, the tipping point is brought closer to zero, making other efforts at managing the asymmetry 
in referring rates more likely to be successful.  
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper offers a more detailed investigation into and explanation of the segregating effects of 
referral recruitment than has previously been available. In doing so, we have subverted the prevailing 
understanding of the role of referral processes in contributing to job segregation. Notably, the prevailing 
                                                 
21 Details on this model are available from the authors upon request. 
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view has focused on the networks of job seekers, and has assumed that short of ending informal 
recruitment via referrals, firms can do little to influence its segregating effects (e.g., National Research 
Council 2004:43). This false assumption has served to exempt firms from responsibility concerning the 
segregating effects of referring processes. We have not only shattered the assumption, but revealed a tool 
through which firms can mitigate the segregating effects of referring. Not only can firms use the 
management of referrer behavior to retain informal recruitment while eliminating its segregating effects, 
but referring can actually be managed such that it is a source of integration, not segregation.    
Sex asymmetries in referring rates are vitally important in job segregation outcomes, and require 
some level of referral homophily with which to interact. The previous understanding has been that the 
demographic composition of referral applicants is a result of the demographic composition of the job 
combined with homophilous contact networks.  Our analysis suggests a new spin: it is the demographic 
composition of referrers interacting with job-specific adjustments to homophily that determines the 
demographic composition of referrals. These characteristics, not the composition of the job, determine 
whether the effects of referring are segregating or integrating. 
Importantly, there is a tipping point for this referring rate asymmetry where referring processes 
can continue without any segregating or integrating dynamics. On one side of this point, referral 
processes tip towards segregation, and on the other, they tip towards integration. Contrary to current 
thinking, the segregating effects of referring are subject to organizational intervention via the lever of sex 
differences in referring rates.  For example, while recruitment policies to attract certain groups are 
routine, our findings direct firms to explore similar appeals to potential referrers as a means of promoting 
integration via this lever (e.g., “women and minorities are especially encouraged to refer.”). Because the 
tipping point can be identified using within-firm data (the sex composition of non-referral applicants and 
the rate of referring), not only does this policy lever have enormous potential, but it is also quite easy to 
operationally define. 
The segregation arising in our model occurs absent the action of what is considered the crucial 
mechanisms for segregation – biases in personnel decisions (Bielby 2000; Kaufman 2002; Petersen and 
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Saporta 2004; Reskin and Bielby 2005). In addition, some scholars have posited that a screening bias 
favoring referral applicants is related to the segregating effects of referring (e.g., Fernandez and Sosa 
2005). Our findings reveal that such biases are not required for referring processes to segregate.  
Our model has focused on job segregation by sex. Having identified asymmetries in referring 
rates as the key contributor to job segregation, we posit that similar dynamics influence job segregation 
by race. Indeed, previous empirical research has documented racial asymmetries in referring rates 
(Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006) and positive adjustments to referral homophily (Fernandez and 
Fernandez-Mateo 2006). Future work will extend the model to explicitly investigate racial segregation 
outcomes from referring dynamics as well as those for race-sex interactions. Further, we claim that any 
groups showing asymmetries in referring rates and referral homophily are likely to be segregated by 
referral processes. 
Finally, we have demonstrated that the mechanisms that we have identified here can exacerbate 
or reduce job sex segregation, even in the absence of any biases in hiring or exit from the firm. Thus, the 
findings of this paper serve as a complement to the current policy instrument of choice for reducing of job 
sex segregation, i.e., the elimination of biases in personnel decisions. This paper establishes the existence 
and direction of these segregating processes. A companion paper, using an agent-based modeling 
approach (Rubineau and Fernandez 2006), explores the relative magnitudes of the segregating effects of 
referring dynamics and bias in personnel decisions. We find that for significant portions of the labor 
market, the segregating effects of referring are non-trivial in magnitude, and actually can exceed those 
due to hiring biases. Those findings, too, serve to further demonstrate the power of the theoretical 
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Janitor, cleaner 61 12 26 27 0.84 0.49 
Misc. machine oper. 78 < 10 29 23 > 0.89 0.56 
Sales worker 32 20 42 6 0.62 0.88 
Cashier < 32 32 56 6 < 0.5 0.90 
Secretary < 32 47 77 < 6 < 0.41 > 0.92 
Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
 
 
I. Table 2 
Table 2a 
Job: 65.7% Female Data: Fernandez & Sosa, 2005 
 Male Applicants Female Applicants Total Applicants 
Referrer Male 43.7 % 56.3 % 375 
Referrer Female 24.9 % 75.1 % 1,056 
Non-referral applicants 35.0 % 65.0 % 2,578 
Homophily adjustment + 8.7 +10.1 +9.4 +/- 0.7 
 
Associated parameter values (rounding to 2 decimal places): 
Same-Sex Referring Probability for men, P = 1 – c + h 
 0.44 = 1 – 0.65 + 0.09 
Same-Sex Referring Probability for women, Q = c + h 
 0.75 = 0.65 + 0.10 
 
Table 2b 
Job: 63.3% Female Data: Fernandez & Fernandez-Mateo, 2006 
 Male Applicants Female Applicants Total Applicants 
Referrer Male 55.7 % 44.3 % 219 
Referrer Female 31.8 % 68.2 % 343 
Non-referral applicants 42.6 % 57.4 % 1,588 
Homophily adjustment +13.1 +10.8 +11.95 +/- 1.15 
 
Associated parameter values (rounding to 2 decimal places): 
Same-Sex Referring Probability for men, P = 1 – c + h 
 0.56 = 1 – 0.57 + 0.13 
Same-Sex Referring Probability for women, Q = c + h 
 0.68 = 0.57 + 0.11 
Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
 
 
II. Figure 1: Markov diagrams 
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III. Figure 2 
 
Equilibrium job composition 
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yields an increasing  slope
Increasing heterophily 
yields a decreasing  slope
Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
 
 




VI. Figure 5 


































































































VII. Figure 6 













































Tipping Points: 11/8/07  Rubineau & Fernandez 
 
 
Appendix: Proofs of claims made in the paper 
 
Claim 1 from page 17:  
The referring transition matrix constructed only from the same-sex referring probability 
parameters, P and Q, will always have an eigenvalue equal to 1. 
 
Proof:  
Let M be a 2 x 2 matrix constructed from only two parameters, P and Q as defined in equation 
(1) above in the paper. Both P and Q can take on any values in the range [0,1], inclusive. 
M will have two eigenvalues: λ1 and λ2, each satisfying the definition of an eigenvalue: 
det(M- λI) = 0. 
Given that M is a 2 x 2 matrix, the eigenvalues may be found by solving the quadratic formula 
below: 
0  = (P – λ) * (Q – λ) – (1 – P)*(1 – Q) 
= PQ – λQ – λP + λ2 – (1 – P – Q + PQ) 
= λ2 – λ(P + Q) + (P + Q – 1) 
The roots of this quadratic formula show that λ1 = 1, and λ2 = (P + Q – 1). 
For all possible values of P and Q except P = Q = 1, λ1 > λ2.  (As we showed in the paper, when 
P and Q both equal 1, there is no equilibrium composition – all jobs retain their initial 
compositions.) 
 
Thus 1 is always the largest eigenvalue of M as defined in equation (1) in the paper. Q. E. D. 
 
Claim 2 from page 18: 
If v is an eigenvector of M, where M is a function exclusively of P and Q, defined as above, then v is also 
an eigenvector of M’, the transition matrix defined in equation (4) in the paper, with the additional r, s, 
and x parameters to allow for varying probabilities in referring, selection for hire, and exiting the job.  As 
with P and Q, the parameters r, s, and x are constrained to the range [0,1], inclusive. 
 
Proof: 
Mv = λv    by definition of eigenvector; 
M’ = (rsM – xI)   from equation (4); 
M’v = (rsM – xI)v  multiplying both sides by v, the eigenvector of M; 
 = rsMv – xv  right distributivity property of matrix multiplication; 
 = rs(λv) – xv  substitution from above; 
 = (rsλ – x)v  distributive property of equality. 
 
Thus, we see that if v is an eigenvector of M associated with eigenvalue λ, then v is also an eigenvector of 
M’ associated with the eigenvalue (rsλ – x).  As we showed above, the eigenvalue of interest of M is 
always equal to 1, therefore the corresponding eigenvalue for M’ is (rs – x). 
 
Appendix: expanded function g: 
g(r, asymir ,c,h) = -(-r+
asym










√[4r2h2+8rc asymir h-4r2h-4rh asymir +4 asymir 2c2+4rc asymir -4 asymir 2c+r2-
2r asymir +
asym
ir
2+8 asymir
2h]) 
